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Abstract. Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of 
ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason or 
feeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. 
The development of Kant’s thoughts on ethics shows the tension between rea-
son and feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, he held to a principle of 
“rational a priori.” On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori 
principle being the binding principle of judgment. On the other hand, it is pre-
sented as the doctrine of “rational fact” as the ultimate argument of his ethics. 
Husserl believed that Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the 
a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doctrine 
of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of an “emotional a 
priori”. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. 
Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and re-
flected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenol-
ogical material ethics of value. 
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Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin 
of ethics, one can ask the question, as Brentano did, of whether the 
principle of ethics is reason or feeling/emotion, or whether ethics is 
grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, 
he held to a principle of “rational a priori.” But Husserl believed that 
Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori 
essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doc-
trine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of 
an “emotional a priori.” Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all 
the way. On the contrary, just before the First World War he revealed 
the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value by 
means of a critique of Husserl’s ethics.  
 




In the first section, we will discuss the principle of “rational a pri-
ori” in Kant’s ethics. Then, Husserl and Scheler’s criticisms of Kant’s 
principle will be discussed separately in the second and third section. 
At last, in the final section, we will focus on the basic positions of 
Husserl and Scheler on the foundation of phenomenological ethics. 
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF RATIONAL A PRIORI IN  
KANT’S ETHICS 
 
From 1770 onwards, Kant held that ethics is grounded on pure rea-
son. He distinguished “the binding principle of judgment” (das 
principium der Diiudication der Verbindlichkeit/das Prinzip der Beurteilung der 
Verbindlichkeit) from “the binding principle of execution” (das 
principium der Execution oder Leistung der Verbindlichkeit/das Prinzip der 
Ausübung der Verbindlichkeit) in order to clarify the position and 
function of feeling in ethics. Kant regarded the guideline (Richtschnur) 
as the principle of judgment, and the incentive (Triebfeder) as the bind-
ing execution (Kant, 2004: 55f). It means that the foundation of ethics 
involves only “the principle of judgment”; that is to say, ethics is 
grounded only on pure reason, but moral feeling can be attributed 
only to “the principle of execution.” Thus, Kant’s mature critical eth-
ics can be called “the ethics of pure Reason.” In his Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explicitly regarded the autonomy of the will 
as the highest principle of morality (Kant, 2007: 440). Kant wrote, 
“The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in con-
formity with the representation of certain laws” (Kant, 2007: 427). And, 
the will is always identified with practical reason by Kant.1 So it is 
clear that ethics, for Kant at that time, is grounded on reason or prac-
tical reason.  
Further, Kant distinguished explicitly a formal principle from a ma-
terial principle. He said, “Practical principles are formal if they abstract 
from all subjective ends, whereas they are material if they have put 
these, and consequently certain incentives, as their basis” (Kant, 2007: 
427). In his later Critique of Practical Reason, Kant stressed: 
 
if a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he can 
think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will 
not by their matter but only by their form … Now, all that remains of a law if 
one separates from it everything material, that is, every object of the will (as its 
determining ground), is the mere form of giving universal law. (Kant, 2003: 27)  
 




Clearly, in his mature critical ethics of pure reason, Kant regarded 
formal principles, the principle of autonomy or the principle of a pri-
ori reason, which differs from the material principle, the principle of 
heteronomy and the principle of a posteriori feeling, as the principles 
of judgment of morality or universal legislation.  
Kant even called heteronomy of the will “the source of all spurious 
principles of morality”. There are two kinds of heteronomy according 
to Kant: the empirical (empirisch) and the rational (rational) principles 
of heteronomy. As to these two principles, Kant is confronted with 
double task. On the one hand, he must overcome the “emptiness” of 
the rational basis of morality (such as the principle of perfection) and, 
on the other hand, the function and role of feeling in ethics must be 
specified. 
It is by his stress upon the law of execution of morality that Kant 
achieved this double task. First of all, the so-called law of execution of 
morality is related to “the respect for the practical principle” as “the 
incentive of pure practical reason.” In Kant’s view, respect (Achtung) 
can only be regarded as the result of law rather than as the cause of it. 
Such a special kind of moral feeling, therefore, is incapable of becom-
ing the principle of judgment in morality, no matter how important it 
is. Thus Kant said that any genuine supreme basic principle of moral-
ity has to rest on pure reason alone, independently of all experience 
(Kant, 2007: 409). 
The attempt to overcome radical empiricism and scepticism in eth-
ics required Kant to answer the question, “How is such a synthetic practi-
cal proposition possible a priori? And why it is necessary?” (Kant, 2007: 
444). This meant that Kant must give his ethics the ultimate founda-
tion (Begründung).  
In Chapter 3 of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS III for 
short), Kant tried to transcendentally deduce the concept of laws of 
morality from the concept of “free,” usually called the transcendental 
deduction of moral laws. There are, however, some insuperable diffi-
culties in such an attempt of transcendental deduction.2 For this rea-
son, Kant had no choice but to attempt to find another way in his 
Second Critique to give his ethics the ultimate foundation. This new 
attempt is contained in the doctrine of “facts of reason” (Faktum der 
Vernunft). 
Kant said:  
 
Consciousness of this fundamental law [das Bewusstsein dieses Grundgesetzes] may be 
called a fact of reason because one cannot reason it out from data antecedent to 




reason, for example, from consciousness of freedom (since this is not antece-
dently given to us) and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a syn-
thetic a priori proposition that is not based on any intuition, either pure or em-
pirical. (Kant, 2003: 31, author emphasis)  
 
In our view, it is the “consciousness” of the fundamental law of 
pure practical reason but not the law of morality that is called “facts 
of reason” by Kant. Or, more precisely, “in order to avoid misinter-
pretation in regarding this law as given, it must be noted carefully that 
it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason” (Kant, 
2003: 31).3 Due to the two words “consciousness” and “given” (gege-
ben) which are emphasized above, it seems that there is every reason 
for one to understand Kant’s doctrine of “fact of reason” as phe-
nomenological but not as ontological. 
In Kant’s view, such a “consciousness” of the law of morality is 
neither empirical intuition nor pure intuition. But then we must ask 
what such a non-empirical, immediate consciousness means at all, or 
how the law of morality is given. Fichte also called this issue into 
question and postulated an “intellectual intuition” (intellektuelle An-
schauung)4 to resolve it. Nevertheless, Kant clearly refused to recognize 
that such a capacity of “intellectual intuition” belongs to human rea-
son, whether in theoretical philosophy or in practical philosophy.5 
Therefore, what such a non-empirical, immediate consciousness im-
plies is still in question. In this sense, one has reason to say that Kant’s 
doctrine of “fact of reason” is groundless (grundlos) (Waldenfels, 2006: 
21). 
However, the “fact of reason” that was identified as the ultimate 
foundation for Kant’s ethics fails to convince. It is therefore impor-
tant that he turned from the strategy of the transcendental deduction 
in GMS III to the strategy of developing this “fact of reason.” From 
such a turn, one can find a new possibility for establishing the ulti-
mate foundation for ethics; that is, developing the arguments for eth-
ics on the basis of moral insights or phenomenological intuition. 
 
HUSSERL’S CRITIQUES OF KANT’S RATIONAL A PRIORI 
 
In ethics, Husserl’s criticism of Kant was focused on his principle of a 
rational a priori, according to which, as to the matter of the founda-
tion of ethics, Kant radically excluded the moments of sense and feel-
ing, in another words, the empirical moments. In Husserl’s view, Kant 
totally overlooked the a priori essential law in the field of feeling or 




disposition (Gemüt) and therefore missed the real foundation of ethics. 
In this sense, we can say that, from the beginning, Husserl’s criticism 
of Kant was focused on Kant’s principle of judgment of morality, that 
is, Kant’s foundation of ethics. In the scope of our theme, I think 
there are three main aspects of Husserl’s criticism of Kant’s ethics.6 
First, reason is thoroughly distinguished from sensitivity or feeling 
by Kant. He regarded sensitivity or feeling as something that has 
nothing to do with the foundation of ethics or the principle of judg-
ment of morality. Obviously, with regard to the matter of the founda-
tion of ethics, Kant totally excluded the distinction he suggested be-
fore, which plays an important role in the ethics, that is, the distinc-
tion between the feelings of lower lever and higher level (Höffe, 2007: 
202). But, following Brentano, Husserl again stressed such a distinc-
tion (Brentano, 1955: 21ff).7 For Husserl, the fundamental mistake of 
Kant lies in the fact that Kant sensualized (sensualisieren) feeling (Hua 
XXXVII, 2004: 233). The reason for this is that Kant still shared the 
preconceptions of his opponents, who were sensualists or naturalists, 
that is, “feeling is the mere natural fact of the psycho-physical organ-
ism of human being” (Hua XXXVII, 2004: 227). For Husserl, a priori 
firstly means the objective essence. Thus, Husserl attempted to look 
for and find such an objective a priori, or “a priori essential law,” in 
all the spheres of consciousness including reason and feeling. 
Second, in Husserl’s view, “the total opposition between sensitivity 
and reason” in Kant “is fundamentally wrong” (Hua XXXVII, 2004: 
220)8 and therefore one cannot radically rule out the phenomenon of 
feeling in its relevance to the foundation of ethics just to achieve the a 
priori and absoluteness of ethics. For Husserl, “a universal ethics ob-
viously must be founded on the theory of value” (Hua XXXVII, 2004: 
24). Husserl further emphasized that such a theory of value is related 
to feeling at first, “the one who correctly acts do the right thing, and 
do the good thing. In this connection, the good is the practical good. 
It must be regarded both as good and as value” (Hua XXVIII, 1988: 
414). 
And, such “regarding as” takes place in “‘rational’ feeling” (vernün-
ftiges Fühlen) (Hua XXVIII, 1988: 414). In other words, in Husserl’s 
view, a universal ethics should be founded on the theory of value, and 
the theory of value should ultimately be founded on such a “rational 
feeling”. Just through this feeling, the good thing that was done or the 
practical good can be regarded both as value or good. And only if 
such a feeling of “regarding as good” goes ahead can one act well. 
This seemingly contradictory expression of “rational feeling” was re-




placed by Husserl later with the more precise term “intentional feel-
ing.” It is the phenomenological analysis of the “rational feeling” or 
“feeling of intentionality” as a “valuelized act” (wertender Akt) that 
forms the starting point of Husserl’s phenomenological ethics. For 
Husserl, the practical law is not a formal but a material “truth of rea-
son.” A genuine morality cannot be prescribed only by “the form of 
rational a priori” but requires a “material determination of the will” 
(Hua XXVIII, 1988: 402f; Hua XXXVII, 2004: 232f).9 Therefore, 
Kant’s requirement of a categorical imperative is totally “absurd” (wid-
ersinnig) for Husserl (Hua XXXVII, 2004: 233, 235). 
Thirdly, according to Kant, the moral categorical imperative is 
given in non-empirical, immediate consciousness. He called this the 
“fact of reason”. Husserl called the categorical imperative “the most 
central problem of ethics” too (Hua XXVIII, 1988: 137), but did not 
accept Kant’s definition of the categorical imperative. He followed 
Brentano who suggested a “formal categorical imperative” (that is, “to 
do the best that you can of what is achievable!” (Tue das Beste unter dem 
Erreichbaren!)) (Brentano, 1955: 15f; 1978: 134ff, 222ff). For Husserl, 
there are two radical absurdities in Kant’s theory of the categorical 
imperative. The first one is that Kant’s categorical imperative is not 
immediately evident but it requires a “choice” (Wahl), which means 
“to choose to do the best as you can”, or “never to choose the less 
good when you can do a greater good” (Spahn, 1996: 30f, 140; Hua 
XXVIII: 132 ff; Melle, 1991: 120f). The second absurdity, in Husserl’s 
view, is that Kant’s categorical imperative is “empty” (leer). The fac-
ulty of universalization that is “merely formal” makes something 
completely “empty”: “The empty possibility of universalizing demon-
strates neither the justifiability of logic and aesthetics, nor the justifi-
ability of ethics” (Hua XXXVII, 2004: 417f). For this reason, Husserl 
criticized the “formalism” in Kant’s ethics (Hua XXVIII, 1988: 414-8). 
We can say, therefore, that Husserl criticized Kant’s theory of the 
categorical imperative on two completely different levels. His criti-
cism that Kant’s categorical imperative cannot serve as the grounds of 
prescription of the will refers to the relationship between formal the-
ory of value and formal “practics” in Husserl. It means that the 
grounds of the determination of the will should be ultimately found in 
the formal theory of value. His criticism that Kant’s categorical im-
perative is empty is one made inside the formal practics.10  
Fundamentally, in Husserl’s view, Kant completely ignored the a 
priori essential law in the fields of feeling and disposition, and did not 
grasp the concept of intentional feeling. Thus, Kant’s ethics, or, more 




precisely, the foundation Kant gives to ethics, again falls into absurd-
ity (Hua XXVIII, 1988: 139). 
 
SCHELER’S CRITICISM OF KANT’S RATIONAL A PRIORI 
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF AN EMOTIONAL A PRIORI 
 
Just as in Husserl, there is a gap between Scheler’s and Kant’s ap-
proaches to ethics. According to Scheler, Kant’s rational reason is an 
“unfounded restriction and limitation of the a priori,” which “also has 
its roots in his identification of the a priori with the ‘formal’” (Scheler, 
1980: 83/64). Scheler said, “Kant’s identification of the “non-formal” 
(material) (in both the theory of cognition and ethics) with “sensible 
[sinnlichen] content” and the “a priori” with what is “thought” or what 
has been an addition to such “sensible content” by way of “reason”” 
is his fundamental error (Scheler, 1980: 73/54). It shows that Kant 
still shares the mistaken premise of sensualism, as Husserl had already 
suggested critically. In Scheler’s view, it is through the concepts of 
“acceptance-spontaneity” that Kant developed a “mythology of pro-
ductive rational activity.” And the fundamental error of Kant’s theory 
of the a priori comes from just such a mythology. Due to the mythol-
ogy, “the ‘form’ to which the a priori is falsely restricted, is, or is sup-
posed to be, the result of a forming activity, of a ‘forming’ and a ‘synthe-
sizing’” (Scheler, 1980: 84/66). In fact, the mythology of Kant “is a 
purely constructivist explanation” and is not based on intuitive or 
phenomenological experience. Besides, it is in this mythology that 
Kant disclosed his own basic attitude and basic position toward the 
world, that is, “a hatred of the world [Welthass]” (Scheler, 1980: 
86/67). 
Such a hatred of the world led Kant to classify all the important 
feelings in ethics (even including love and hate11) as “disordered 
chaos” or field of mere sensitivity and therefore to exclude them on 
the foundational level of ethics. Just as Husserl, Scheler here followed 
Brentano’s basic claim. He believed that there is a basic distinction 
between lower and higher feelings. Kant, however, eliminated and 
fused this distinction in the fundamental dichotomy of reason and 
sensitivity. Even the sole exception of “the feeling of respect” in Kant 
has nothing to do with the principle of judgment of morality (Scheler, 
1980: 247f, 240ff, 391ff).  
Scheler completely agreed with Kant’s critique of all the Epicurean-
ism/hedonism in ethics. They both believed that there can never be a 
field of a priori in Epicureanism, and that Epicureanism was bound to 




finally lead toward the relativism and scepticism in ethics. But Scheler 
did not totally reject the starting point of Epicureanism, as Kant did. 
Scheler demonstrated ethics by emotions, and developed an “a priori 
emotion” for founding his a priori and at the same time material eth-
ics by revealing the a priori of the field of emotions.12 
Briefly, in Scheler, all the feelings are not “a disordered chaos” and 
there are essential differences in quality and depth in the field of feel-
ing.13 Thus, in contrast with Kant’s “hatred of the world,” Scheler’s 
basic position and attitude to the world is the “lived affair with the 
world” (lebendigen Verkehr mit der Welt) (Scheler, 1980: 87/68) in feeling 
and emotion. Like Husserl, Scheler found the a priori essential law in 
the field of feeling. Therefore, the “lived affair with the world” of 
Scheler could well be feeling or emotional, and at the same time abso-
lute or a priori. 
Scheler said clearly, “The emotive elements of spirit, such as feeling, 
preferring, loving, hating and willing, also possess original a priori con-
tents which are not borrowed from ‘thinking,’ and which ethics must 
show to be independent of logic” (Scheler, 1980: 82/63). 
The “original a priori” is completely independent of inductive ex-
periences, and independent of the experience of epistemology in gen-
eral. On the contrary, “as with thought, there is the intuiting of es-
sences of acts and their correlates, their foundations, and their inter-
connections. In both cases there is ‘evidence’ and maximum exactness 
of phenomenological findings [strengste Exaktheit der phaenomenologischen 
Feststellung]” (Scheler, 1980: 84/65). 
Or, as Paul Good pointed out correctly, such an evidently essential 
a priori of emotion/feeling can be called “grammar of feeling” 
(Grammatik der Gefühle). (Good, 2000: 21ff, 25ff).14 
Therefore, Scheler claimed that there is a priori “order of heart” 
(ordre du coeur) or “logic of heart” (logique du coeur), as Blaise Pascal 
aptly called it (Scheler, 1980: 260/254). The “order” or “logic” here is 
completely different from the “reason” in general logic, but means 
“the non-logical a priori aspect” at first. Then, says Scheler,  
 
axioms of values are wholly independent of logical axioms and are not mere “ap-
plications” of the latter to values. Logic and a pure doctrine of values [reine Wertlehre] 
stand side by side … The phenomenology of values and the phenomenology of emotive life 
are completely independent of logic, having an autonomous area of objects and 
research. (Scheler, 1980: 83/64). 
 
His phenomenological material ethics of value is founded on just 
such a pure theory of value and the phenomenology of emotional life. 




The establishment of an a priori-material ethics primarily requires 
us to abandon the dualistic supposition that the opposition of “rea-
son” and “sensitivity” is enough to define the spirit of human beings, 
or that the human spirit can be divided into either one or the other. 
Scheler’s intention is very clear. He is unable to accept the ethics of 
pure reason that Kant criticized, not to mention unable to accept the 
other side of the dualistic opposition that is denied by Kant; that is to 
say, he will not simply turn back to ethics before Kant or before 
Kant’s critical period. For that reason, although Scheler completely 
denied Kant’s “Copernican revolution,” we are unable to say he insti-
gated a “Ptolemaic counterrevolution” at all. Scheler’s fundamental 
position is to radically cancel such an “either-or” dualistic opposition 
itself. Or, we can say, it is just the significance of a phenomenological 
revolutionary, whether on the level of theoretical philosophy, or on 
the level of practical philosophy! 
Finally, Scheler developed an “emotional a priorism” and also an 
“ethics of a priori-emotion,” of which the latter is relative to both 
general empirical ethics of emotion (such as Epicureanism) and an ab-
solute, a priori ethics of reason (such as Kant’s pure critical ethics). In 
Scheler’s view, however, Kant did not pay attention to the “circle of 
facts” (Tatsachenkreis), which provides the basis for such an “ethics of 
a priori-emotion”. And the “rational facts” to which Kant resorted to 
demonstrate his ethics of a priori reason is still “ungrounded.” Scheler 
(1980: 66/47) asked, “What is the difference between a ‘fact of pure 
reason’ and a merely psychological fact?” For Scheler, because of the 
absence of a “phenomenological experience” or intuition of essence, 
Kant could not answer this question at all. In contrast with Kant, 
Scheler took the concept of “phenomenological or pure facts” as the 
ultimate basis of his phenomenological ethics. The “phenomenologi-
cal or pure facts” in Scheler imply the self-given “material a priori” in 
phenomenological experience or intuition of essence, but such a “ma-
terial a priori” contains three kinds of a priori which are different but 
relevant to each other: a priori acts, the a priori fact-contents of acts, 
and the a priori essential interconnections of acts to their fact-
contents. These three kinds of a priori are all material a priori, for 
they can all be self-given as “material” in phenomenological experi-
ence. On the level of ethics, they are shown as emotional a priori, 
value a priori (which is grasped in emotion) and the relevant a priori 
of emotion-value. 
 




REASON OR EMOTION: HUSSERL AND SCHELER’S FOUN-
DATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHICS 
 
In Husserl, evaluating acts, intentional feeling and so-called “rational 
feeling” are basically subjected to reason in general. In this sense, 
therefore, we cannot even say that, in contrast with Kant’s rational 
ethics, Husserl developed an ethics of emotion or a moral philosophy 
of feeling. Rather, Husserl still held on to a rational ethics. But such a 
reason comes to be a “universal reason,” the sense of which is ex-
panded by Husserl. For him, reason is “a title for an all-embracing es-
sentially necessary structural form belonging to all transcendental sub-
jectivity. Reason refers to possibilities of verification; and verification 
refers ultimately to making evident and having as evident” (Hua I, 
1950: 92). According to this, the final requirement of phenomenology 
in general is to develop a “complete rational phenomenology,” and 
such a complete rational phenomenology would eventually be in ac-
cordance with or consistent with “phenomenology in general” (Hua 
III/1, 1976: 323). On the level of ethics, Husserl finally developed a 
universal, rational self-conditioned idea (Hua XXXVII, 2004: 243ff).15 
Different from Husserl, Scheler decisively developed an emotional 
a priorism and ethics. For Scheler,  
 
there is also a pure intuiting and feeling, a pure loving and hating, a pure striving and will-
ing, which are as independent of the psychophysical organization of man as pure 
thought, and which at the same time possess their own original laws that cannot 
be reduced to laws of empirical psychic life. (Scheler, 1980: 259f./254) 
 
Such a pure feeling, a pure preferring, a pure loving and hating is sig-
nified as “value-intuition,” “value-cognition” or “moral insight” by 
Scheler. And he believed that “all ethics must go back to the facts ly-
ing in moral cognition and their a priori interconnections” (Scheler, 
1980: 88).16 At the same time, Scheler emphasized, “moral cognition 
and moral insight themselves are not ethics.” In this connection, in fact, 
Scheler regarded the theory of value and the theory of moral cogni-
tion as the introduction of an ethics upon which the phenomenologi-
cal ethics will finally be founded.17 Then it is clear that, different from 
Kant, Scheler founded his phenomenological material ethics of value 
on a priori emotionality, by which he explicitly and clearly answers the 
question he proposed (1980: 260/254): “Can an ethics be both abso-
lute and emotional?” 




It can be said that both the rational ethics expanded by Husserl and 
the emotional ethics expanded by Scheler are a priori, absolute ethics. 
Both of them are different from Kant’s ethics, and take in the ele-
ments of a priori emotion. But these two kinds of expansion lead the 
acts of human spirit in different directions (one toward reason, an-
other toward emotion/feeling). And the fates of their phenomenol-
ogical ethics are also different.  
As Husserl announced, “no one has any way to deny the universal 
control of logical reason,” and evaluating and practical reason is dumb 
and somehow deaf, “so the torch of logical reason must be held high, 
so as to illuminate what is obscured in the forms and norms of the 
field of disposition and willing” (Hua XXVII, 1988: 57, 59, 68f). After 
all, inside the expanded concept of reason, Husserl finally insists on 
the domination of reason to sensitivity, which was repeatedly insisted 
on by Kant. Their distinction only lies in the fact that Kant’s reason 
and sensitivity both put on the coat of reason (expanded by Husserl), 
and achieve the a priori. The premise of Kant’s dualism, however, re-
appears with another face. More essentially, the traditional prejudices 
about the status of reason and sensitivity suppress the original posi-
tion of phenomenological ethics once again. Ethics is always quasi-
theoretical science, although it is universal and a priori.18 
In Scheler, however, the expansion of the concepts of “emotion” 
or “feeling” offers an entirely different possibility. Both the act of 
feeling and the act of representation have their own essential forms of 
intentionality according to Scheler. They both are independent acts of 
spirit and therefore cannot be reduced to each other. Based on this, if 
the act of feeling itself has its own special relation with the object, and 
is itself an independent act, then the dependence of the act of feeling 
on the act of representation or, more precisely, the dependence of the 
act of feeling on the material of the act of representation, or the 
founding relation of the act of feeling to the act of representation, is 
untenable.19 
What’s more, Scheler entirely turns over Husserl’s “material found-
ing relation” in order to gain the “original” position of the act of 
value-feeling and its correlate (value). In Scheler’s view, “value-
ception [Wertnehmen] … precedes all representational acts according to 
an essential law of origins. Its evidence is largely independent of the 
evidence of representations [vor-stellen]” (Scheler, 1980: 209f./201), 
“any intellectual comprehension of what something is presupposes an emo-
tive value experience of the object … Value-ception [Wertnehmung] al-
ways precedes perception [Wahrnehmung]” (Scheler, 1980b: 109f.).20 




The achievement of Scheler’s turning-over may be seen as the gaining 
of the primacy of phenomenological material ethics of value relative 
to epistemology. And such an a priori-emotional ethics is eventually 
based on the immediate, original, lived affair with the world, in other 
words, a love of the world.21 
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1 For example, Kant, 2007: 412, 441. It should be especially mentioned here that 
Kant used the concept of “reason” (Vernunft) in two senses: 1) in the broader 
sense, reason is equal to high-level cognitive capacity as a whole, which includes 
“understanding” (Verstand) and reason in the narrow sense; and 2) in the narrow 
sense, reason refers to the highest level of cognitive capacity. Also see, Rudolf 
Eisler, Kant-lexikon. Nachschlagwerk zu Kants saemtlichen Schriften, Briefen und 




handschriftlichen Nachlass, Berlin, 1930, unchanged reprinted version: 
Hildesheim/Zuerich/New York, 1984: 572ff. In this paper, the concept of rea-
son is used in its broader sense, such as “rational a priori,” “rational moral,” etc. 
In the first place, it refers to a cognitive capacity of “a high-level,” relative to 
“sensibility” or “feeling.” 
2 Limited to the theme and length of this text, we are unable to exhaust the tran-
scendental deduction of moral laws developed by Kant in GMS III and the diffi-
culties existing in it. In the field of Kantian study, such a matter is the focus and 
central issue of study. There is an abundance of literature on it. In my view, the 
more important studies on it are the following: Dieter Henrich, “Die Deduktion 
des Sittengesetzes. Über die Gründe der Dunkelheit des letzten Abschnittes von 
Kant Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.” In Denken im Schatten des 
Nihilismus. Festschrift für Wilhelm Weischedel zum 70. Geburtstag. Ed. von Alexander 
Schwan. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975. 55–112; Henry E. 
Allison, Kant’s theory of freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 
especially 214–229; Dieter Schönecker, Kant: Grundlegung III. Die Deduktion des 
kategorischen Imperativs. Freiburg/München: Alber, 1999. 
3 As far as I know, there are three different opinions contained in the various 
interpretations of Kant’s “fact of reason” in the field of Kantian study: 1) “Fact” 
means the law of morality itself (such as in Lewis White Beck and the like); 2) 
“fact” means the consciousness of the law of morality (such as, in Otfried Höffe 
and Henry E. Allison, and so on); and 3) Kant’s “fact” (Faktum) comes from the 
Latin word factum whose original meaning is a means of action (Tat) (for example, 
in Marcus Willaschek, such an interpretation radically overturns the tradition and 
is, in fact, developed on the basis of Fichte’s thoughts). Here, we accept the 
second opinion. Cf. Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical 
Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960; von Karl-Heinz Ilting, Kants 
“Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. Ein Kommentar. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 
1995. 158–168; L. W. Beck, “Das Faktum der Vernunft. Zur 
Rechtfertigungsproblematik in der Ethik.” Kant-Studien. 52 (1960/1961): 271–
282; Otfried Höffe, Immanuel Kant. München: Beck, 2007. 207–212; Henry E. 
Allison, Kant’s theory of freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 
230–249; Marcus Willaschek, Praktische Vernunft: Handlungstheorie und 
Moralbegründung bei Kant. Stuttgart/ Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 1992, 169–193. 
4 Johann G. Fichte, “Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre.” In Johann G. 
Fichtes sämmtliche Werk. Ed. von J. H. Fichte, Berlin: Verlag von Veit und Comp., 
1845: 472. 
5 For example, cf. Kant, 2004: 307; 2003: 31. 
6 As to the detailed comparative study on the practical philosophy of Husserl 
and Kant, cf. Thomas Cobet, Husserl, Kant und die praktische Philosophie. Analysen 
zu Moralität und Freiheit. Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 2003.  
7 As to the relationship in ethics between Husserl and Brentano, cf. Ullrich Melle, 
“Zu Brentanos und Husserls Ethikansatz. Die Analogie zwischen den 
Vernunftarten.” Brentano-Studien 1 (1988): 109–120. 
8 Hua XXXVII, p. 220 
9 It should be pointed out that Husserl here used the pair of conceptions “form-
material” in Kant’s sense. Thus, one should not confuse Husserl’s own concep-




tions “form-material” with it, such as “formal praxeology-material praxeology” 
and “formal ontology-material ontology,” etc. Husserl clearly emphasized that, 
“in this respect, we must clearly separate our way from Kant’s doctrines” (Hua 
XXVIII, 2004: 139). 
10 In this connection, I cannot agree with Henning Peucker. On the one hand, I 
think that Husserl’s criticism of formalism (i.e. the universal emptiness) in 
Kant’s ethics should not be confused with his criticism of Kant’s “unreasona-
ble” formalness without content. The latter means Kant missed the material 
feeling on the level of the grounds of prescription of the will and the value 
grasped in feeling. On the other hand, Husserl’s “formal” praxeology should not 
be regarded simply as the “formalism” of ethics (cf. Henning Peucker, “Husserl’s 
Critique of Kant’s ethics.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 (2007): 310, 313, 
316ff.). In fact, Husserl also later criticized Brentano and his “formal categorical 
imperative.” Limited to the length of the text, we will develop this point else-
where.  
11 See, Scheler, 1980: 83/65, footnote 19: “It is this prejudice that led Kant to 
the monstrous opinion that love and hate are ‘sensible feeling-states’.” 
12 It is necessary to distinguish several concepts used by Scheler here. Emotion 
(Emotion) is the broadest concept, which can include feeling (Fuehlen), feeling-
state (Gefühlszustende) or feeling-content, preference (Vorziehen), rejection (Nach-
setzen), affection (Affekt), love and hate, and such as empathy, pain, regret, shame, 
resentment, respect, humbleness, etc. In this sense, we can talk about Scheler’s 
phenomenology of emotional life. In other words, the emotional a priori is used 
in this broadest sense as we talk about it in contrast with Kant’s rational a priori. 
Sometimes Scheler directly said “a priori feeling.” It is more against the school 
of English moral feeling and, of course, it can be said it’s against Kant’s moral 
feeling ethics in his second stage. Nevertheless, the difference in meaning ex-
pressed by “emotional a priori” or “feeling a priori” is clear, so we will no longer 
distinguish specifically between these two expressions in this paper. 
13 We will discuss such essential differences in quality and depth in the field of 
feeling in the last section. 
14 In the field of emotion/feeling, Scheler always used the expression of “gram-
mar” too. For example, cf. Scheler, 1973: 22, 92, 112. 
15 For deeper research on Husserl’s ethics as rational theory and as area ontology, 
cf. Hans Rainer Sepp, Praxis und Theoria. Husserls transzendentalphilosophische Rekon-
struktion des Lebens. Freiburg/Muenchen: Alber, 1997. 130–154. 
16 Of course, the interconnections between “value-cognition” and “moral cogni-
tion” are presupposed here. We will discuss it elsewhere. 
17 W. Henckmann once reminded us that one should not confuse the theory of 
value with ethics itself if one wants to correctly and systematically grasp the ba-
sic intention of Scheler’s philosophy. Cf. Henckmann, 1998: 102. 
18 For the detailed study on the relation of Husserl’s theoretical philosophy to 
his ethics, see also Hans Rainer Sepp, Praxis und Theoria. Husserls transzendentalphi-
losophische Rekonstruktion des Lebens. Freiburg/Muenchen: Alber, 1997. 
19 Cf. Wei Zhang, “The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feel-
ings.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 4.1 (2009): 130–42. 




20A. Stüttgen discussed Husserl and Scheler’ exploration on intentionality and 
founding relations in his doctoral dissertation. Limited to the objective condi-
tions of study, however, he only dealt with the texts of Husserl’s logical investiga-
tion and Idee I and Scheler’s formalism, ethics and epistemology (X), and so on, but 
overlooked their other relevant manuscripts. So he was unable to develop the 
questions in his discussion in a detailed manner. Cf. Albert Stüttgen, Der 
Gegenstandscharakter der Werte bei Scheler im Hinblick auf Husserl. Bonn: Universitaet 
Bonn, Diss, 1957. 
21 Many thanks to Prof. Eugene Kelly (New York) and M. A. Wang Honghe 
(Köln) for modifying the English version of this essay. 
